JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. * There is now a consensus of opinion that the propensity of an enterprise to engage in international production-that financed by foreign direct investmentrests on three main determinants: first, the extent to which it possesses (or can acquire, on more favorable terms) assets1 which its competitors (or potential competitors) do not possess; second, whether it is in its interest to sell or lease these assets to other firms, or make use of-internalize-them itself; and third, how far it is profitable to exploit these assets in conjunction with the indigenous resources of foreign countries rather than those of the home country. The more the ownership-specific advantages possessed by an enterprise, the greater the inducement to internalize them; and the wider the attractions of a foreign rather than a home country production base, the greater the likelihood that an enterprise, given the incentive to do so, will engage in international production. This eclectic approach to the theory of international production may be summarized as follows.2 A national firm supplying its own market has various avenues for growth: it can diversify horizontally or laterally into new product lines, or vertically into new activities, including the production of knowledge; it can acquire existing enterprises; or it can exploit foreign markets. When it makes good economic sense to choose the last route (which may also embrace one or more of the others), the enterprise becomes an international enterprise (defined as a firm which services foreign markets). However, for it to be able to produce alongside indigenous firms domiciled in these markets, it must possess additional ownership advantages sufficient to outweigh the costs of servicing an unfamiliar or distant environment [Hirsch 1976 ]. The function of an enterprise is to transform, by the process of production, valuable inputs into more valuable outputs. Inputs are of two kinds. The first are those which are available, on the same terms, to all firms, whatever their size or nationality, but which are specific in their origin to particular locations and have to be used in that location. These include not only Ricardian type endowments-natural resources, most kinds of labor, and proximity to markets,3 but also the legal and commercial environment in which the endowments are used-market structure, and government legislation and policies. In classical and neoclassical trade theories, differences in the possession of these endowments between countries fully explain the willingness and the ability of enterprises to become international;4 but since all firms, whatever their nationality of ownership, were assumed to have full and free access to them (including technology), there were no advantages to be gained from foreign production.
INTRODUCTION
The second type of input is that which an enterprise may create for itself-certain types of technology and organizational skills-or can purchase from other institutions, but over which, in so doing, it acquires some proprietary right of use. Such ownership-specific inputs may take the form of a legally protected rightpatents, brand names, trade marks-or of a commercial monopoly-the acquisition of a particular raw material essential to the production of the product-or of exclusive control over particular market outlets; or they may arise from the size or technical characteristics of firms-economies of large-scale production and surplus entrepreneurial capacity. It should be observed that these ownership advantages are not exclusive either to international or multinational firms. Some are applicable to all firms producing in the same location; others are those which a branch plant of an existing enterprise may enjoy over a de novo enterprise of the same nationality.5 But, because they operate in different locationspecific environments, multinational firms may also derive additional ownership advantages-such as, their ability to engage in international transfer pricing, to shift liquid assets between currency areas to take advantage of (or protect against) exchange fluctuations, to reduce risks by diversifying their investment portfolios [Rugman 1979] , to reduce the impact of strikes or industrial unrest in one country by operating parallel production capacity in another and by engaging international product or process specialization [Dunning 1977 ].
The essential feature about these second types of inputs is that, although their origin may be linked to location-specific endowments, their use is not so confined. The ability of enterprises to acquire ownership endowments is clearly not unrelated to the endowments specific to the countries in which they operateand particularly their country of origin. Otherwise, there would be no reason why the structure of foreign production of firms of different nationalities should be different. But, in fact, it is so-and substantially so. A recently published paper ] has shown that Japanese firms have a comparative advantage in the foreign production of textiles and clothing and consumer electronics; UK firms in food and tobacco products; Swedish firms in mechanical and electrical engineering; West German firms in chemicals; and U.S. firms in transport equipment. Such differences as these can be explained only by an examination of the characteristics of the endowments of the countries in which the multinational enterprises operate, and especially those of the home country, which normally give rise to the ownership advantages in the first place. Raymond Vernon's product cycle theory was among the first to use this approach from the viewpoint of U.S. direct investment abroad [1966] . More recently Birgitta Swedenborg [1979] has extended and applied it to a study of Swedish, U.S., and UK direct foreign investment. The paper by deals with the industrial structure of foreign direct investment of five countries: UK, Sweden, Japan, West Germany, and the U.S. asserting that the relationship between ownership-and locationspecific endowments is more complex than was once thought. Moreover, often a longish time lag may be involved; many of today's ownership advantages of firms are a reflection of yesterday's location advantages of countries. But, whatever the significance of the country of origin of such inputs, they are worth separating from those which are location-specific, because the enterprise possessing them can exploit them wherever it wishes, usually at a minimal transfer cost. Moreover, unless it chooses to sell them, or the right to their use, to other enterprises, the endowments are-for some period of time at least-its exclusive property.
Both modern trade and international production theory have embraced this kind of endowment which is often mobile between countries but not between firms. Indeed, over the last twenty years there has been a convergence in the explanation of the movement of goods and of factor inputs across national boundaries. Alongside the neotechnology theories of trade, which assert that the extent 10 to which a country possesses technology is a key determinant of patterns of trade in manufactured goods between nations [Hufbauer 1970; Hirsch 1974] , there is the knowledge theory of direct investment, which explains the pattern of international production in terms of the distribution of knowledge between firms of different nationalities [Johnson 1970 ]. Parallel with the hypothesis that patterns of trade can best be explained by the extent to which enterprises in different countries possess monopolistic, scale, or product differentiation advantages, are the theories of direct investment which focus on product differentiation, entrepreneurial capacity and multiplant economies [Caves 1971 . In the last five or six years, it has become increasingly recognized that neither a location nor an ownership endowment approach, by itself, can satisfactorily explain all forms of trade-although particular kinds of trade may be better explained by one approach rather than by another [Hirsch 1976 ]. It is now also accepted that an ownership endowment approach (first pioneered by Kindleberger and Hymer and later refined by Caves) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for explaining international production. Only if both of the right dispositions of resource endowments exist between countries and firms of different nationalities will international production take place. There is one final strand to the eclectic theory of international production. The possession of ownership advantages determines which firms will supply a particular foreign market, whereas the pattern of location endowments explains whether the firm will supply that market by exports (trade) or by local production (non-trade). But why does a firm choose to use the ownership advantages itself to exploit a foreign market-whatever route it chooses-rather than sell or lease these advantages to a firm located in that market to exploit? Why does it internalize its capital, technology, management skills itself to produce goods rather than externalize their use by engaging in portfolio investment, licensing, management contracts, and so on? The basic incentive of a firm to internalize its ownership endowments is to avoid the disadvantages, or capitalize on the imperfections, of one or the other of the two main external mechanisms of resource allocation-the market or price system and the public authority fiat. Market imperfections arise wherever negotiation or transaction costs are high, wherever the economies of interdependent activities cannot be fully captured, and wherever information about the product or service being marketed is not readily available or is costly to acquire. From a buyer's viewpoint, such imperfections include uncertainty over the availability and price of essential supplies and inability to control their timing and delivery. From a seller's viewpoint, the preference for internalizing will be most pronounced where the market does not permit price discrimination, where the costs of enforcing property rights and controlling information flows are high, or where, in the case of forward integration, the seller wishes to protect his reputation by ensuring a control over product or service quality or after-sales maintenance [Brown 1976 ]. For both groups of firms, and for those considering horizontal internalization, the possession of underutilized resources-particularly entrepreneurial and organizational capacity, which may be exploited at low marginal cost to produce products complementary to those currently being supplied-also fosters internalization. Public intervention in the allocation of resources may also encourage firms to internalize their activities. This arises particularly with respect to government legislation toward the production and licensing of technology, including the patent system, and where there are differential tax and exchange rate policies, which multinational enterprises may wish either to avoid or exploit. As described then, the propensity to internalize ownership or location advantages6 make up the third strand in the eclectic theory. In most of the conventional literature on trade and international investment, it is this last aspect of the theory 11 that has been most seriously neglected. For it is not just the possession of technology per se which gives an enterprise selling goods embodying that technology an edge over its international competitors, but also the advantages which arise from internalizing that technology rather than selling it to a foreign producer for the production of those goods. In other words, without the advantages of internalization much of direct foreign investment would be replaced by the international transaction of resources on a contractual basis between independent buyers and sellers.
To conclude this brief theoretical introduction, a matrix is presented which attempts to relate, in an encapsulated form, the main types of activities in which multinational enterprises may be involved to the three main determinants of international involvement. (See Table 1 ). Such a table may be used as a starting point for an examination of the industrial and geographical distribution of foreign direct investment. It will be noted that as part of the explanation of ownership endowments, the possession of home country endowments has been added because these will influence the geographical origin of such investment.
AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES
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Broadly speaking, there have been five approaches to testing the theory of international production. The first has attempted to explain the causes of direct foreign investment by examining its industrial composition from the viewpoint of individual home countries (almost exclusively the U.S.) and host countries (notably Canada, UK, and Australia). A common thread running through all these studies7 is that they have sought to explain the pattern of foreign direct investment in terms of ownership advantages of MNEs. The second approach has been to look at the form of international economic involvement and to identify the determinants of whether foreign markets are exploited by trade or nontrade routes. advantages of the countries in which they produce relative to those of other countries. H2 The form of the involvement, or participation, will essentially depend on the relative attractiveness of the location-specific endowments of the home and host countries.14 That the gains to be derived from internalizing activities, which would otherwise be allocated by markets or government fiat, make up an important part of ownership advantages, and, in some cases, of location advantages as well is also contended. Concerning H1, we shall take as our dependent variable the share of the output of a particular industry (IS) in a particular country supplied by exports (X) plus local production (AS) of U.S.-owned firms:15 AS+X/IS. These components can, of course, be considered separately; but, in this hypothesis, we wish to exclude location-specific variables influencing the form of involvement. This dependent variable is notated as DV 1. 16 The two components of international involvement may be considered separately. DV 2 signifies the share of the affiliates' sales of total output in the host country (AS/IS), and DV 3, the share of exports from the U.S. of that output (X/IS). Concerning H2, the dependent variable-DV 4-is defined as X/IS-AS/IS (or simply X/AS); in other words, it is the ratio between exploiting a particular market by exports from the U.S. relative to local production by U.S. affiliates in the country of marketing. The higher this ratio, the more the U.S. is favored as a location for production, relative to the country in which the goods are being sold (or being exported from).
THE STATISTICAL TESTING The Dependent
Variables:
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We now turn to a statistical testing of the two main hypotheses. Hypothesis 1-The international competitive hypothesis The overall involvement index reflects both location-and ownership-specific advantages. The explanation of the foreign production ratio lies in identifying and measuring ownership advantages (as the location of production is assumed to be the same for all firms) and that of the export ratio in both location and ownership advantages. Looking at the export ratio, one naturally turns to trade theories for guidance; but no attempt, to our knowledge, has been made to explain shares of a particular industry's sales accounted for by foreign imports.17 In discussing the determinants of foreign production, one should be concerned solely with ownership advantages; yet, the fact that trade and production are often related to each other suggests that these advantages may also be associated with locationspecific endowments.18 Explanations of foreign production, which ignore the latter advantages, are likely to be inadequate, thus supporting the need for an eclectic theory of production and trade. The share of a particular industry's output supplied by foreign affiliates is determined by the competitive advantages of the affiliates and the relative attractions of the host country as a production base. It is likely to be greatest where the barriers to entry facing indigenous producers and exports from the home (and other countries) are highest. Trade is similarly determined except that it will flourish where barriers to exports are low and where barriers to entry to all producers in the host country are high. International involvement is determined simply by the competitive advantage of the investing and exporting firms vis-a-vis indigenous and other foreign companies. In symbolic terms:
where C= international competitive advantage (to be defined) DV 2 AS/IS = f (C,X/AS) and DV 3 X/IS = f (C,X/AS) Hypothesis 2-The location hypothesis This is simple and straightforward. To produce a particular good, an enterprise will choose that location which best advances its overall goals. The interface between received location theory and the MNE is a relatively unexplored territory, but a good start has been made by Vernon [1974] . In principle, there is no reason to suppose a national multiplant firm would behave very differently if its plants were located in a different country. New variables-such as exchange risks, differences in taxation rates, and policies of host governments toward inward direct investment-may need to be incorporated, but this can be done without too much difficulty. The location hypothesis is solely concerned with country-specific variables affecting (1) the size and character of markets (which may be affected by competitor's behavior) and (2) production and transfer costs, though these may have a special impact on MNEs because of their ability to internalize the costs and benefits of some of the differences which exist between countries. The hypothesis may be expressed as:
where L= locational advantage of the home country (to be defined).
Hypothesis 1
To assess the competitive advantage of firms of one nationality over those of another-both in particular industries and countries-one must evaluate: (1) allocative, technical, and scale efficiency; (2) product range and quality; and (3) market power. Because we are concerned with inter-industry comparisons, allocative efficiency of resources between industries may be discounted. However, goals may differ between firms, as may the competence of firms to achieve these goals. For example, the greater the innovative ability of an enterprise, the more resourceful and the more talented its managerial and labor force, the higher its market share is likely to be. Similarly, the advantages of size, of being part of a larger organization, and of being able to internalize external economies will affect a firm's competitive situation independently of the location of its activities. Some of these variables, of course, reflect the industry or country characteristics of firms. Governments, for example, can and do influence the extent to which there is an adequate labor force to draw upon, the promotion of new technologies, the role of advertising in fostering product differentiation, and so on. These factors are acknowledged and have been considered explicitly elsewhere [Dunning 1979]. It may be helpful to break H1 down into two sub-hypotheses. The first is: H1a Given the export-participation ratio (X/IS), the foreign production-participation ratio (AS/IS) will be highest in those industries where the comparative advantage of foreign (meaning U.S. here) firms is greatest vis-a-vis indigenous firms. In principle, many of these advantages may be captured in a catchall measure, as in the comparative productivity of U.S. firms and host country firms or some proxy for integration-such as, percent of net to gross output. The comparative advanThe Independent Variables tage of U.S. firms is presumably highest where their relative productivity or valueadded ratio is highest; therefore, in those cases, the affiliate penetration ratio should be highest. In practice, difficulties in measuring productivity and identifying internalizing economies make both measures of doubtful applicability. H1b Given the production-participation ratio (AS/IS), the export penetration-participation ratio (XIIS) will be highest in those industries where the national resource endowments of the U.S. are greatest in comparison to those of other countries, and where barriers to trade are minimal. Location theory approaches export success more in terms of difference in absolute production costs and the costs of traversing space. Artificial barriers to trade include those imposed by governments or imperfect markets. An incentive to export may also result from the inability of a host country's firms to compete effectively, due to the absence of a market sufficiently large to yield economies of scale in production.
Hypothesis 2 Like H1b, the second hypothesis appears to be explained best by the theories of trade and location. Among the relative costs that play an important part in determining the location choice are those of labor and material inputs. The former are particularly critical in this study because it is limited to manufacturing industries where horizontal direct investment is the rule. This is in contrast to the situation in resource industries where vertical direct investment plays a much greater role. By the same token, labor productivity and its growth will be important elements in determining the real value of labor. Production costs may be closely related also to the scale of plant which can be built. Market size will, therefore, be relevant. So, also, will rates of growth of the markets involved because they will determine the extent to which economies of scale may be exploited in the future.
The Choice of Independent Variables for this Exercise
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Table 2 lists some of the variables which might be considered as proxies for ownership-and /ocation-specific advantages. An asterisk identifies those variables which might also be used as indices of internalization advantages.19 Some of these are very similar to each other; not all can be used for this particular exercise, partly because it is concerned with explaining patterns of involvement by industries rather than by firms, and partly because of data constraints. It will also be noted that for some variables set out, data are required for host countries; in others, for the home country, or for both host and home countries. Where only the home country is involved, location advantages become irrelevant, and one cannot use the data to determine both industry and country participation ratios. The main constraint, however, has been the paucity of good data about host countries which seriously inhibits testing both hypotheses for the seven countries considered separately. This exercise omits the two LDCs, partly because the data are less certain for these two countries, and partly so that a tariff variable could be used-data for which were not available for Mexico and Brazil. In the end, the independent variables were chosen and used to test both hypotheses. Data on each relate to 1970, or the nearest year, except where otherwise stated. The data for these variables were extracted mainly from the U.S. Tariff Commission Study, except for those on imports which were obtained from the OECD Commodity Trade Statistics Series C, and tariffs from a Political and Economic Planning publication [1965] . A schematization of variables follows. ountres Such a large number of independent variables invites problems associated with multicollinearity. These problems were compounded when the two different groups of independent variables were tested against the 'wrong' dependent variables as well, in order to determine if the general hypotheses were too restrictive. It was, therefore, decided to correlate separately each of the independent variables with the dependent variables (DV1-4) to determine which ones appeared worthy of further statistical investigation. Only those which approached significance at a 95 percent level were incorporated into multivariate form. The large number of equations tested, given four dependent variables and twelve independent variables, also sharply increased the possibility of chance significance. Because of this, any value below the 99 percent significance should be treated with caution. These countries vary quite considerably in income levels, economic structure, political ideologies, culture, proximity to the U.S., and the extent to which they, themselves, spawn MNEs which compete in international markets with U.S.-based MNEs. It would not be surprising to find that different factors explain the absolute and relative success of U.S. exports and affiliate production in these countries when tested individually; here, however, we are concerned with factors which explain export and affiliate success in the seven countries as a group, and which can, perhaps, be regarded as "worldwide" determinants of such success. H1 (DV1-3) Table 3 That this last variable appears to be collinear with SER is not unexpected because higher salaries are usually obtained by more highly skilled nonproduction employees. These same relationships were run using the 1966 data; the results obtained were much the same with the exception that the 1966 profit variable, net income to sales (AVNIS), is never quite significant.
H2 (D V4)
The results obtained from this hypothesis set out in Table 4 are quite different from those of H1. Two variables, the export/import ratio (XMR) and net income to sales (AVNIS), are consistently significant at the 99 percent level and explain nearly 60 percent of the variation in the location ratio. Growth of relative sales per man (GRSPM) comes very close but is never quite significant. The results for 1966 were virtually the same as for 1970.
Quite early in the study, it was decided to run the data with Mexico and Brazil excluded. Although, to a certain extent, each country exercises its own unique set of influences on the involvement of foreign firms, there is something to be said for separating Mexico and Brazil from the other five countries. Historically, LDCs have produced relatively more raw materials and semi-finished manufactures and fewer finished products for world markets than the developed countries, and investment in resource-based industries is often based on very different considerations than investment in manufacturing.1 Mexico and Brazil, in spite of recent rates of rapid industrial growth, are still sufficiently different in their stages of development to justify separate treatment. 
H1 (DV1-DV3)
The results are presented in Table 5 . In all equations, one ownership variable, the skilled employment ratio ( Table 6 , quite different variables explain most of the form of penetration from those which explain the first three variables. The profitability ratio (AVNIS) and the growth in sales per man (GRSPM) are consistently significant, the former at extremely high levels of significance and the latter at either 99 or 95 percent levels of significance. These two alone explain more than half the variance in the location ratio. Other variables which are occasionally significant are two ownership variables, average hourly compensation (AHC) and relative sales per man (RSM). They are only significant in small groups, however, which suggests an overlap between many of these variables. Equation 4 of DV4 is a good example where differences in wage costs (RW) are significant at 99 percent, and RS at 95 percent, and where R2 is 0.5633. 22 The data for 1966 yield similar results with country or industry (rather than ownership) differences in profitability (AVNIS) and growth in sales per man (GRSPM, an ownership variable) being rather more significant. But, in this case, MG (market share) becomes marginally significant in combination with GRSPM. None of the labor cost and productivity variables are significant. Excluding Mexico and Brazil, the seven-country analysis produced some noticeable differences in the results of the statistical analysis. This section considers a few of these and speculates on the reasons for them. First, the general level of the R2 rises quite noticeably. This suggests that the independent variables used were more relevant in explaining export and affiliate success in the more advanced industrialized countries than in Mexico and Brazil. Running the regressions excluding Canada suggests that even higher R2s could have been obtained. (This run was not undertaken because it would have substantially reduced the degrees of freedom). Second, the data for 1966 as well as for 1970 indicate that differences in wage costs (RW) and export shares (RS) tend to be more significant in explaining H1 (DV2) in the seven-country than in the five-country case. Perhaps these variables are too similar over different industries in the industrialized countries; and, not until the widely different figures for Mexico and Brazil are included, is their influence clearly indicated. Third, AHC differences are significant in the compensation of the five-country but not in the seven-country case for H2 (DV4). This discrepancy is difficult to interpret. It may result from the less reliable figures on hourly compensation in Mexico and Brazil than in the other countries, or from the vastly different labor force structure which influences the extent to which local firms can compete successfully against imports in different ways. Fourth, in the case of H1 (DV1), there are virtually no differences between Cases A and B. There is one major difference between the two cases involving DV4: the export/import ratio (XMR) is significant with the larger group but not with the smaller. This may be interpreted to mean that the export potential of an industry may be more important in a less developed economy in determining the form of penetration. The negative sign implies that U.S. firms in those industries will tend to establish affiliates rather than export to the less developed countries, perhaps, to export some portion of their output. This is consistent in both the product cycle model's last stage and the growth of export-platform investments in some developing countries, including Mexico.
The statistical analysis was restricted to common linear regression analysis and was carried out by Guy Landry at the University of Reading Computing Center. Initially, single variable regressions with each of the independent variables and for each dependent variable were run. The purpose was to choose potentially useful explanatory variables from the number available. As a result of this a few variables were dropped because they either indicated no explanatory value or appeared less useful than very similar variables which were retained. The next step involved multiple regressions. As explained in the body of the paper, the independent variables were divided into three categories:
a 
